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Abstract. In the (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme, it is difficult to ensure that internal
participants are honest. In this paper, a verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme is designed
combined with classical secret sharing scheme. First of all, the distributor uses the asymmetric binary
polynomials to generate the shares and sends them to each participant. Secondly, the distributor sends
the initial quantum state with the secret to the first participant, and each participant performs unitary
operation that using the mutually unbiased bases on the obtained d dimension single bit quantum state (d
is a large odd prime number). In this process, distributor can randomly check the participants, and find
out the internal fraudsters by unitary inverse operation gradually upward. Then the secret is reconstructed
after all other participants simultaneously public transmission. Security analysis show that this scheme
can resist both external and internal attacks.
PACS. 00 00 – 20 00 – 42 10
1 Introduction
In 1979, the secret sharing scheme was first proposed
by Shamir [1] and Blakely [2], which is an important tech-
nology to ensure the security and availability of confiden-
tial information. In addition, they are widely used as the
components of various cryptographic protocols, such as
threshold cryptography, attribute-based encryption and
multi-party computing. In the (t, n) threshold secret shar-
ing scheme, the secret is divided into n shares so that it can
only be recovered with t or more than t shares, but fewer
than t shares cannot reveal any information of the secret.
At present, the research of classical secret sharing scheme
has become mature [3,4,5]. However, most of the schemes
have the following potential security hazard: it is impos-
sible to check the honesty of internal participants in the
secret recovery phase. Therefore, the verifiable secret shar-
ing (VSS) scheme was proposed by Chor et al. [6] in 1985.
The purpose of the VSS scheme is to prevent participants
from providing wrong shares in the secret recovery phase.
So far, more and more theories of VSS [7,8] have been
put forward. However, all of the VSS schemes are based
on the assumption of computational complexity, namely
security is conditional. With the improvement of comput-
ing capabilities and algorithms, especially the emergence
of quantum algorithms [9], the security of classical cryp-
tography is facing severe challenges. In addition, as the
extension of classical secret sharing scheme in the quan-
tum field, the research of quantum secret sharing scheme
plays an important role.
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In 1999, the quantum secret sharing (QSS) scheme was
first proposed by Hillery, Buzek and Berthiaume [10],which
attracted widely attention. QSS scheme still adopts the
secret system of classical secret sharing scheme, which
uses the quantum state as the encoding carrier of secret
information. QSS scheme can be divided into two cate-
gories starting from the type of shared information: 1) QSS
scheme of sharing classical information [11,12,13]; 2) QSS
scheme of sharing quantum information(quantum state)
[14,15,16,17]. The former presents various characteristics
in the scheme design, while the latter is mostly realized
by means of quantum entanglement swapping and quan-
tum teleportation. Many QSS schemes are (n, n) thresh-
old [18,19,20] that need all participants to reconstruct the
secret together. In order to improve the flexibility and
practicability, the (t, n) threshold quantum secret shar-
ing (TQSS) schemes [14,21,22,23] were proposed. These
TQSS schemes only aim at how to make t shares or more
than t shares reconstruct secret through security channel.
However, there may be dishonest participants to provide
wrong shares which lead to the errors of recovered secret
in real life. Thus the verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum
secret sharing (VTQSS) scheme was proposed to verify
the shares. In 2011, the VTQSS scheme was proposed by
Yang et al. [24]. The security of it was analyzed by Song
and Liu [25], and they found it could not prevent forgery
attack of participants. In 2016, Qin and Dai [26] proposed
a VTQSS scheme using d dimension Bell state. With the
higher and higher requirements for verifiability, the re-
search on VTQSS scheme [27] is gradually in-depth.
Lu et al. [28] proposed the VTQSS scheme based on
the threshold secret sharing scheme of shamir which using
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the d dimension single bit quantum state. In this scheme,
a detection particle is added to detect external attack and
internal fraudsters by using the equality relationship be-
tween two secrets. However, the number used to recon-
struct the secrets is randomly selected by the participants,
the distributor cannot identify them. If there are dishon-
est internal participants who provide wrong shares in the
secret sharing phase, the scheme is destroyed but the in-
ternal attacks cannot be detected.
In this paper, we propose a VTQSS scheme based on
d dimension single bit quantum state, and d is a large odd
prime number. In this scheme, the distributor generates
shares and distributes them to each participant in the clas-
sical secret distribution phase. In the secret sharing phase,
after all participants perform unitary operations contin-
uously on the quantum state prepared by the distribu-
tor, the last participant uses the measurement basis sent
by the distributor to obtain the result, which is publicly
transmitted to the distributor and all other participants
simultaneously. Then the other participants transmit the
information they have to the distributor and the partic-
ipants who need to recover the secret simultaneously, so
the secret is reconstructed. The advantages of the scheme
are as follows:
1) The subshares used to reconstruct the secrets is gen-
erated by asymmetric binary polynomials, which are
owned by both the distributor and the participant, and
can be detected at any time.
2) The distributor can find out the scheme errors in time
by checking randomly, and can find out the fraudsters
and eliminate them by upward step-by-step inspection,
which use the unitary inverse operation. Thus the con-
stant waste of resources can be avoided.
3) Public transmission simultaneously can not only pre-
vent participants from sending wrong results, but also
prevent other participants from pretending the partic-
ipant to fraud.
4) The TQSS scheme is more flexible and applicable than
the (n, n) threshold QSS scheme.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the section
two, the classical secret sharing scheme which is based
on the asymmetric binary polynomials, mutually unbiased
bases and simultaneous public transmission is reviewed. In
the section three, the improved VTQSS scheme is intro-
duced. In the section four, the security of this scheme is
analyzed. In the section five, namely the last part, this
scheme is summarized.
2 Basic knowledge
In this section, we will introduce the basic knowledge
used in the scheme design, including the concept of pro-
tected secret sharing scheme, mutually unbiased bases and
simultaneous public transmission.
2.1 Classical secret sharing scheme based on
asymmetric binary polynomials
Lein et al. proposed the protected secret sharing (PSS)
scheme in 2017. The scheme is designed by using asym-
metric binary polynomials F (x, y), where F (x, y) is with
degree at most t − 1 in x and with degree at most h − 1
in y. It can be expressed as
F (x, y) = a0,0+a1,0x+a0,1y+· · ·+at−1,h−1xt−1yh−1. (1)
where ai,j ∈ D, ∀i, j ∈ [0, t− 1] and the coefficient satisfies
ai,j 6= aj,i, ∀i, j ∈ [0, t− 1]. This kind of polynomials is
called as asymmetrical binary polynomial.
In the PSS scheme, the distributor uses an asymmet-
ric binary polynomial F (x, y) to generate a pair of shares
s
(1)
i (y) = F (xi, y) and s
(2)
i (x) = F (x, xi) for shareholders,
where i = 1, 2, · · · , n. The shares F (xi, y) and F (x, xi) are
all univariate polynomials, where F (xi, y) is with degree
at most h−1 and F (x, xi) is with degree at most t−1, and
F (xi, xj) 6= F (xj , xi). A pairwise keys can be established
between the shareholders Ui and Uj :
ki,j = s
(1)
i (xj) = s
(2)
j (xi) = F (xi, xj),
kj,i = s
(2)
i (xj) = s
(1)
j (xi) = F (xj , xi).
Therefore, a pairwise shared key can be established
between two shareholders to ensure that the reconstructed
secret is not obtained by the nonshareholders by using
asymmetric binary polynomial.
2.2 Mutually unbiased bases
In many quantum information processing, mutually un-
biased bases (MUBs) plays an important role. The knowl-
edgeable of MUBs is given as follows.
Definition 1 Assuming that
B0 =
{∣∣∣ϕ(1)0 〉 , ∣∣∣ϕ(2)0 〉 , · · · , ∣∣∣ϕ(d)0 〉} and
B1 =
{∣∣∣ϕ(1)1 〉 , ∣∣∣ϕ(2)1 〉 , · · · , ∣∣∣ϕ(d)1 〉} are two sets of or-
thonormal bases in d dimension space, if they satisfy∣∣∣〈ϕ(l)0 ∣∣∣ ϕ(j)1 〉∣∣∣ = 1√
d
.
they are said to be unbiased.
If any two sets of orthonormal bases {B0, B1, · · · , Bm}
in Cd space are unbiased, then the set is called unbiased
base set.
It is known from the literature [29,30] that when the
dimension of quantum system d is an odd prime num-
ber, at least d + 1 MUBs can be found. In particular,
the computation basis is expressed as {|k〉|k ∈ D}, where
D = {0, 1, · · · , d − 1}. For the sake of consistency, this
scheme is limited d to an odd prime number. In addition
to the computation basis, the remaining d MUBs can be
expressed as:
∣∣∣φ(j)l 〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωk(l+jk) |k〉
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where ω = e2pii/d, j ∈ D represent the number of unbiased
bases, l ∈ D enumerate the number of vectors for the given
base., These unbiased bases satisfy:
|〈ϕ(j)l |ϕ
(
j
′
)
l
′ 〉| = 1√
d
where j 6= j′
We can see from the formula
∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉 = 1√d d−1∑
k=0
ωk(l+jk) |k〉
that B = {B0, B1, · · ·Bm, · · ·Bd} is a set of MUBs:
when j = 0,
B0 =
{∣∣∣ϕ(0)0 〉 , ∣∣∣ϕ(0)1 〉 , · · · , ∣∣∣ϕ(0)l 〉 , · · · |l ∈ D};
when j = 1,
B1 =
{∣∣∣ϕ(1)0 〉 , ∣∣∣ϕ(1)1 〉 , · · · , ∣∣∣ϕ(1)l 〉 , · · · |l ∈ D};
· · · · · ·
when j = m,
Bm =
{∣∣∣ϕ(m)0 〉 , ∣∣∣ϕ(m)1 〉 , · · · , ∣∣∣ϕ(m)l 〉 , · · · |l ∈ D};
· · · · · ·
when j = d, we can make
Bd = {|0〉 , |1〉 , · · · , |l〉 , · · · |l ∈ D}.
The coding operations in the literature [18] are com-
posed of two unitary operators Xd and Yd, where:
Xd =
d−1∑
n=0
ωn |n〉 〈n|,
Yd =
d−1∑
n=0
ωn
2 |n〉 〈n|.
Lemma 1 D is a finite field. From the formula
∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉 =
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωk(l+jk) |k〉, we can see that the MUBs has the fol-
lowing properties:
1) when the unitary operator Xd is applied to particle∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉, its subscript will change, namely Xxd ∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉 =∣∣∣ϕ(j)l+x〉.
2) when the unitary operator Yd is applied to particle∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉, its superscript will change, namely Y yd ∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉 =∣∣∣ϕ(j+y)l 〉.
Proof 1)
Xxd
∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉 =
(
d−1∑
n=0
ωxn |n〉 〈n|
)(
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωk(l+jk) |k〉
)
=
(
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωk[(l+x)+jk] |k〉
)
=
∣∣∣ϕ(j)(l+x)〉 .
The following 2) can be proved by the same way.
For ∀x, y ∈ D, a unitary matrix can be constructed
so that
∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉 can be transformed into ∣∣∣ϕ(j+y)l+x 〉. That is
to map the elements of B into B. Let the unitary matrix
Ux,y = X
d
xY
d
y , then we have Ux,y
∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉 = ∣∣∣ϕ(j+y)l+x 〉.
2.3 Simultaneous public transmission
The so-called simultaneous public transmission means
that a participant sends a message to different people
through secret channels at the same time, which is the
same as the concept of mail CC. It can realize:
1) The sender sends the information simultaneously and
the receiver receives it at the same time. It can prevent
some receivers from receiving the correct information
in advance, but forge the sender to send the wrong
information to other receivers.
2) That is to send the same message. It can prevent the
sender from sending different information to different
receivers, which will result in wrong information.
3 Scheme description
In this section, we present a (t, n) threshold secret
sharing scheme using the single bit quantum state, which
includes two parts: the classical secret distribution phase
and the secret sharing phase. Alice is the distributor and
Bobi(i = 1, 2, · · · ,m) are the participants who has the only
public identity xi (i ∈ D), that is xi 6= xj (i 6= j).
3.1 Classical secret distribution phase
At first, Alice chooses a random asymmetric binary
polynomial:
F (x, y) = a0,0 + a1,0x+ a0,1y + · · ·+ at−1,h−1xt−1yh−1.
which need to meet h > t (t− 1).
1) Alice calculates a pair of shares s
(1)
i (y) = F (xi, y)
and s
(2)
i (x) = F (x, xi), and sends
{
s
(1)
i (y) , s
(2)
i (x)
}
through the secret channel to the Bobi.
2) Participants Bobi and Bobj(assume i < j) can com-
pute a pairwise shared key:{
ki,j = s
(1)
i (xj) = s
(2)
j (xi) = F (xi, xj)
kj,i = s
(2)
i (xj) = s
(1)
j (xi) = F (xj , xi)
.
3.2 Secret sharing phase
At first, the distributor Alice prepares the quantum
state |Φ〉 =
∣∣∣ϕ(0)0 〉 = 1√d d∑
j=1
|j〉 and the secret S ∈ D.
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1) Alice performs unitary operation Up0,q0 = X
p0
d Y
q0
d on
|Φ〉, that is Up0,q0 |Φ〉 = |Φ〉0 =
∣∣ϕq0p0〉, where p0 = S,
and q0 is arbitrary value.
2) Assuming that Alice needs to share the secret among
m participants {Bobi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m}, she will send
|Φ〉0 to Bob1 at first.
i) After Bob1 receiving |Φ〉0, he will perform unitary op-
eration Up1,q1 on it, where p1 = k1,2, q1 = k2,1. Then
the quantum state |Φ〉0 changes to |Φ〉1 =
∣∣ϕq0+q1p0+p1〉,
Bob1 sends |Φ〉1 to Bob2.
ii) Participant Bobj, j = 1, 2, · · ·m repeats the operation
that Bob1 conducts in i). That is, Bobj performs uni-
tary operation Upj ,qj on |Φ〉j−1, then he gets the quan-
tum state |Φ〉j =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
j∑
r=0
qr
j∑
r=0
pr
〉
, where pj = kj,j+1, qj =
kj+1,j , pj , qj ∈ D. Bobj will send |Φ〉j to the next par-
ticipant Bobj+1, j = 2, 3, · · ·m− 1.
3) In the process of 2), Alice randomly checks Bobu
(0 ≤ u ≤ m). She sends
u∑
i=0
qi to Bobu by using cu =
E
s
(1)
u (0)
(
u∑
i=0
qi
)
encryption. After Bobu receiving cu,
u∑
i=0
qi = j is obtained by using Ds(1)u (0)
(ci) decryption.
He measures |Φ〉u to get lu by using the measurement
basis
{∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉}
l
, then he encrypts and sends it to Alice.
If Alice check lu =
u∑
i=0
pi is satisfied, there are no in-
ternal fraudsters in the previous u participants. Then
the scheme can continue.
i) If Alice find out the internal fraudster is existence, the
participant Bobu performs the unitary inverse opera-
tion U−pu,−qu on |Φ〉u, then he sends the result |Φ〉
′
u−1
to Bobu−1. The above operation is repeated again, Al-
ice check whether lu−1 =
u−1∑
i=0
pi is satisfied. If it is
satisfied, Bobu is the internal fraudsters and he will be
eliminated.
ii) If it is not satisfied, the above i) operation is repeated
again, and check it upward in turn until the internal
fraudsters is found out and eliminated.
4) The last participant Bobm gets the quantum state |Φ〉m
by unitary operation, and he chooses
{∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉}
l
as the
measurement basis to measure the quantum state and
gets the result R. After Bobm uses cki,m = Eki,m (R) to
encrypt R, he simultaneous public transmits it to Al-
ice and Bobi through the security channel. Then they
can get R after using Dki,m
(
ck
i,m
)
to decrypt. In this
part, the measurement basis j =
m∑
i=1
qi is sent to Bobm
through the the same way as 3) by Alice.
5) After Bobj (j 6= i) uses ckj,i = Ekj,i (pj) to encrypt pj ,
he simultaneous public transmits it to Alice and Bobi
through the security channel. Then they can get Pj
after using Dkj,i
(
ckj,i
)
to decrypt. When Alice and
Bobi (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m; i 6= j) get R and all Pj (j 6= i),
Alice checks whether the number obtained is correct.
6) If Alice checks it is correct, Bobi (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m) can
reconstruct the secret
P0 = R−
m∑
j=1
pj .
Otherwise, Alice will terminate the scheme, remove the
participants who sent the wrong number more than twice,
and start it again.
4 Security analysis
In this section, the completeness and safety of the
scheme will be analyzed. The security analysis includes
external attack and internal attack.
4.1 Completeness analysis
We will prove the completeness of the scheme next.
In the (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, the secret
is divided into n shares. Only through t or more than
t shares can the secret be reconstructed, but less than
t shares cannot recover any information of the secret. It
means the scheme satisfies the completeness.
1) In the classical secret distribution phase, if the asym-
metric binary polynomial F (x, y) satisfies h > t (t− 1),
then t shares or more than t shares can reconstruct the
secret, but less than t shares cannot get any informa-
tion.
Proof For h > t (t− 1), because F (x, y) is an asymmet-
ric binary polynomial, where the degree of x is t− 1 and
the degree of y is h−1, it contains th different coefficients.
In this proposed scheme, each share
{
s1i (y) , s
2
i (x)
}
con-
tains two univariate polynomials, where the degree of y is
h − 1 and the degree of x is t − 1. In other words, each
shareholder can use its shares to establish at most t+h lin-
early independent equations according to the coefficients
of the binary polynomial F (x, y). When there are t − 1
shareholders merging with their shares, they can establish
a total of (t+ h) (t− 1) linearly independent equations.
If the number of the coefficients of the binary polynomial
F (x, y) is larger than the number of equations of the com-
bined shareholders, that is, th > (t+ h) (t− 1). t− 1 dis-
honest shareholders cannot recover F (x, y). As a result,
they cannot get any secret information. Thus h > t (t− 1)
can ensure that less than t shares cannot disclose any se-
cret information.
2) In the secret sharing phase, it can be seen from S =
p0 = R−
m∑
j=1
pj that we need m participants cooperate
to reconstruct secret.
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4.2 Security analysis
1) External attack
i) Intercept-and-Resend attack
Assuming that there is an external attacker Eve carry
out the intercept-and-resend attack, she intercepts the
quantum state |Φ〉j during the transmission of Bobk and
Bobk+1, and she retransmits her own forged particle, where
1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1.
Since the measurement basis in this scheme
k∑
i=0
qi =
q0 + q1 + · · · + qk is not published to the public, the
eavesdropper Eve does not know any information about
it. Therefore, Eve can only choose one of d groups re-
lated measurement basis to get the original secret. Only
when the selected basis is the real measurement basis,
she can get the right measurement results. Then she only
has the possibility of 1
d
successfully obtaining the number
k∑
i=0
pi = S + p1 + · · · + pk. It can be seen that whether
Eve can succeed largely depends on d, and d is a large
odd prime number, which is the same as the success rate
of directly guessing the secret. Then Eve needs to prepare
the same quantum state to send to Bobk+1. Otherwise,
Alice will check and find out it, then she will terminate
the scheme. Thus intercept-and-resend attack is invalid for
this scheme.
ii) Entanglement measurement attack
The second attack which can be carried out by eaves-
dropper Eve is entanglement measurement attack. If Eve
makes an auxiliary quantum state at first, then she per-
forms unitary transformation UE to entangle the auxiliary
quantum state to the transmitted particles, and finally she
steals information by measuring the auxiliary particles.
Through unitary transformationUE , it can be expressed
as follows:
UE |k〉 |E〉 =
d−1∑
m=0
akm |m〉 |εkm〉 . (2)
UE
∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉 |E〉
=UE
(
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωk(l+jk) |k〉
)
|E〉
=
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωk(l+jk)
(
d−1∑
m=0
akm |m〉 |εkm〉
)
=
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
m=0
ωk(l+jk)akm
(
1√
d
d−1∑
g=0
ω−m(g+jm)
∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉
)
|εkm〉
=
1
d
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
m=0
d−1∑
g=0
ω(kl+jk
2)−(mg+jm2)
∣∣∣ϕ(j)g 〉 |εkm〉 . (3)
where ω = e2pii/d, |E〉 represents the initial state of the
auxiliary system of Eve, and |εkm〉 (k,m = 0, 1, · · · , d− 1)
represents the only pure state after the auxiliary transfor-
mation UE . Therefore, the coefficients satisfy:
d−1∑
m=0
|akm|2 = 1, k = 0, 1, · · · , d− 1.
To prevent the error rate from increasing, Eve sets
akm = 0, where k 6= m, k,m ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}, thus
the equations (2) and (3) can be simplified as:
UE |k〉 |E〉 = akk |k〉 |εkk〉 .
UE
∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉 |E〉 = 1d
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
g=0
ωk(l−g)akk
∣∣∣ϕ(j)g 〉 |εkk〉.
Similarly, Eve can get the following equations:
d−1∑
k=0
ωk(l−g)akk |εkk〉 = 0.
where g ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}, g 6= l. It can get d equa-
tions for arbitrary l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}. a00 |ε00〉 = a11 |ε11〉 =
· · · = ad−1,d−1 |εd−1,d−1〉 can be calculated by d equations.
In order to steal effective information, we assume that
Eve performs unitary operation UE, that is
UE
∣∣∣ϕ(0)0 〉 = 1√
d
(a00 |0〉 |ε00〉)
+
1√
d
(a11 |1〉 |ε11〉) + · · ·
+
1√
d
(ad−1,d−1 |d− 1〉 |εd−1,d−1〉)
=
1√
d
(|0〉+ |1〉+ · · ·+ |d− 1〉)
⊗ (a00 |ε00〉)
Therefore, no matter what kind of quantum state is
adopted, Eve can only get the same information from the
auxiliary particles. So the entanglement measurement at-
tack cannot be successful in this scheme.
1) Internal attack
Because the conspiracy of participants is a kind of de-
structive attack which is easier to steal effective informa-
tion than the external attack, the participants honest or
not is related closely to the security of the scheme.
i) Forgery attack
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a) We can assume that the participants Bob1 is an in-
ternal fraudster. After he receives the quantum state
|Φ〉0 from Alice, because j = q0 is arbitrary number
of the measurement basis
{∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉}
l
, the probability
of choosing the right measurement basis is 1
d
, where
d is a large odd prime number, and the probability
of failure is d−1
d
, which is the same as the probabil-
ity of directly guessing the secret S. In case of Bob1
forges quantum state transmission, Alice will find the
existence of the internal fraud through random check
Bobu. If the former participants u (1 ≤ u ≤ m) can be
checked in turn through the unitary inverse operation
to find the internal fraudsters, the scheme will be ter-
minated and remove Bob1 from the participants.
b) We can assume that the participants Bobj
(2 ≤ j ≤ m− 1) is an internal fraudster. j =
j∑
i=0
qi is
arbitrary number of the measurement basis
{∣∣∣ϕ(j)l 〉}
l
.
The probability of choosing the right measurement ba-
sis is 1
d
, where d is a large odd prime number, and the
probability of failure is d−1
d
. And he can steal the in-
formation
j∑
i=0
pj = S + p1 + · · · + pj , thus he cannot
reconstruct the secret. In case of Bobj forges quantum
state transmission, Alice will find the existence of the
internal fraud through random check Bobu. If the for-
mer participants u (1 ≤ u ≤ m) can be checked in turn
through the unitary inverse operation to find the in-
ternal fraudsters, the scheme will be terminated and
remove Bobj from the participants.
c) We can assume that the participants Bobm is an in-
ternal fraudster. Because Bobm simultaneously pub-
lic transmits R to Alice and Bobi through the secure
channel, Alice will immediately discover and remove
the forgeries once she find R is wrong.
ii) Conspiracy attack
In this scheme, it is assumed that the worst case
scenario is that only the distributor Alice and one par-
ticipant are trusted. We can assume that Bob1 is hon-
est, the remaining m − 1 participants may carry out
conspiracy attack. In the process:
a) If the dishonest participants forge particles, Alice will
check and find out it.
b) If one or more participants send the wrong pj (j 6= 1)
and R to the other participants in the secret shar-
ing phase, because they simultaneously public trans-
mit, Alice will immediately discover it, terminate the
scheme, and remove the forgeries.
c) Since the secret must be reconstructed through S =
p0 = R−
m∑
i=1
pm, m−1 participants cannot reconstruct
the secret.
Therefore, the forgery attack and conspiracy attack of
participants cannot obtain the secret in this scheme, and
Alice will discover it and remove the forgeries.
5 Summary
In this paper, a VTQSS scheme using d dimension sin-
gle bit quantum state is proposed. In the scheme design,
we combine the binary asymmetric polynomials of the
classical part with the unitary opration of the quantum
part based on the mutually unbiased bases. Thus the secu-
rity is guaranteed at every stage. The distributor prevents
the internal attack through random detection. Once it is
found out, she will detect and eliminate the internal fraud-
sters by unitary inverse operation. And the participants
fraud is avoided through the method of simultaneous pub-
lic transmission. In addition, the security of the scheme is
analyzed. Of course, due to the current technology, the
complexity of the scheme still needs to be improved. We
hope to propose a better verifiable quantum secret sharing
scheme in the future.
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